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-----2Translating, Repeating,
Naming:
Foucault, Derrida,
and The Genealogy of Morals

Gary Shapiro
Two cautions or warnings (at least) must be heeded in the attempt to
do justice to Nietzsche's project of a genealogy of morals in the text
that bears that name. While the Genealogy is often regarded as the
most straightforward and continuous of Nietzsche's books, he tells us
in Ecce Hmno that its three essays are "perhaps uncannier than
anything else written so far in regard to expression, intention, and the
art of surprise." 1 If we should think ourselves successful in penetrating
to these uncanny secrets and saying what Nietzsche's text means,
once and for all, we would then have to read again its lapidary
although parenthetical injunction that "only that which has no
history can be defined." For since the work of Theodor Adorno and
Max Horkeimer, Jurgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida,
and Gilles Deleuze, genealogy has become a polemical word. When
Nietzsche published the Genealogy in 1887, the main uses of the term
arguably had to do with the ascertaining of actual family lineages to
determine rights to titles, honors, and inheritances, as in the venerable
Almanach of Gotha, and a careless librarian today might classify the
book among those many middle-class popularizations which might all
go under the title "Tracing Your Family Tree for Fun and Profit." But
Foucault characterizes his History of Sexuality as a genealogy of the
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modern self, and Derrida describes a large part of his intellectual
project as "repeating the genealogy of morals"; Nietzsche's practice
and example are invoked in both cases.
How, then, might we proceed to assess the significance of Nietzsche's "genealogy" in relation both to its mundane cousins and to
those who have been drawing on his inheritance? I propose only a
partial, critical, and bifocal effort in that direction, consisting in a
reading of a few paradigmatic readings of Nietzschean genealogy. Let
me begin with the interpretation of Jurgen Habermas, who assimilates
Nietzsche's project to the aristocratic attempt to demonstrate the
superiority of the most ancient and archaic. According to Habermas,
Nietzsche's rejection of all rational and critical criteria for assessing
values leaves him no other option:
Once the critical sense of saying "No" is suspended and the procedure of negation is rendered impotent, Nietzsche goes back to
the very dimension of the myth of origins that permits a distinction which affects all other dimensions: What is older is earlier in
the generational chain and nearer to the origin. The more
primordial is considered the more worthy of honor, the preferable, the more unspoiled, the purer: It is deemed better. Derivation and descent serve as the criteria of rank, in both the social
and the logical senses.
In this manner, Nietzsche bases his critique of morality on
geneaf,ogy. He traces the moral appraisal of value, which assigns
a person or a mode of action a place within a rank ordering
based on criteria of validity, back to the descent and hence to the
social rank of the one making the moraljudgment. 2
This may be the genealogical scheme of values of the Almanach of
Gotha, but it is not Nietzsche's. Despite his frequent bursts of admiration for the "blond beasts" (lions) of early cultures, Nietzsche's narrative never returns us to a point at which one single, pure form of
morality obtains. Contrary both to the efforts of theological ethics and
to the hypotheses of the English utilitarian historians of morality, The
Geneaf,ogy of Morals insists that there is no single origin but only opposition and diversity no matter how far back we go. There are, always
already, at least two languages of morality, the aristocratic language
of "good and bad" and the slavish language of "good and evil."Where a
Platonist would focus on the fact that "good" appears in both discourses and would search for its common meaning, Nietzsche notes
that it is only the word shared by the two languages. One says "good"

